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Fixed Instruments to Cope with Stock Externalities 
An Experimental Evaluation 
Summary 
We evaluate the effectiveness of non optimal and temporally inconsistent incentive 
policies for regulating the exploitation of a renewable common-pool resource. The 
corresponding game is an N-person discrete-time deterministic dynamic game of T 
periods fixed duration. Three policy instruments with parameters that remain constant 
for the whole horizon are evaluated: a pigouvian tax (flat tax), an ambient tax (ambient 
flat tax) and an instrument combining the two previous ones (mixed flat instrument). We 
test in the lab the predictions of the model solved for 3 distinct behavioural 
assumptions: (a) sub-game perfection, (b) myopic behaviour, and (c) joint payoff 
maximization. We find that subjects behave myopically in the unregulated situation, 
which agrees with previous results in the literature. Conditional on predictions, the 
mixed flat instrument and the flat tax are the most effective policies in approaching the 
optimum extraction path. However, in absolute terms the ambient flat tax and the mixed 
flat instrument curb most significantly the mean extraction path towards the optimum 
path. Paradoxically, these instruments are the less efficient ones. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Managing  the  exploitation  of  renewable  natural  resources,  designing  policies  aimed  at 
reducing  water  or  air  pollution,  or  fighting  against  global  warming,  requires  taking  into 
account  stock  externalities.  Unlike  static  externalities  whose  detrimental  effects  disappear 
after  some  time,  stock  externalities  generate  persistent  effects  due  to  the  accumulation 
process. Examples include greenhouse gases emissions, groundwater withdrawals, fisheries 
exploitation,  etc....  In  contrast  to  static  externalities,  which  may  be  remedied  by  policies 
correcting  inefficient  decisions,  for  stock  externalities  no  instant  policy  is  capable  to 
remediate immediately the damage created in previous periods. Once the resource stock has 
been deteriorated current policies can only curb the dynamic externalities beyond the current 
period. Empirical and experimental findings showed that in a dynamic environment, resource 
exploitation can lead to dramatic inefficiencies, enhancing the need for effective policies to 
cope with them (Clark, 1974; Herr et al, 1997; Giordana, 2007). In this paper, we analyze 
policy  instruments  targeted  to  achieve  a  second-best  withdrawal  path  in  the  case  of  a 
common-pool renewable resource.  
 
The  literature  on  externalities  puts  traditionally  forward  Pigouvian  taxes  as  a  particularly 
adapted policy for correcting externalities (Baumol and Oates, 1988), although unit taxes are 
inefficient when the regulator cannot observe individual actions. Observability of individual 
actions rests on the availability of monitoring technologies and/or negligible observational 
costs (Millock et al, 2002). If such technology is available, unit taxes can be enforced by the 
regulator through incentive mechanisms such as random auditing combined to penalties in 
case  of  detected  shirking  (Becker,  1968;  Polinsky  and  Shavell,  1979;  Kritikos,  2004).  If 
monitoring  technologies  are  not  available,  or  observational  costs  are  prohibitive,  in  most 
instances  the  regulator  can  nevertheless  periodically  observe  the  state  of  the  resource. 
Instruments developed initially to cope with nonpoint-source pollution can be implemented 
efficiently in these cases (e.g. the ambient tax). 
 
In a dynamic framework with a finite horizon, policy parameters can be adjusted from one 
period  to  the  next  to  adapt  incentives  to  the  observed  state  of  the  resource  and  to  the 
remaining time. Efficient internalization of a dynamic externality can therefore be achieved 
by adjusting the tax rate, the penalty, and the targets after each period (Xepapadeas, 1991; 
Xepapadeas, 1992; Xepapadeas, 1994). From a practical point of view, the implementation of 
such a dynamic policy instrument is generally not feasible; the regulator’s policy choice set is 
therefore  constrained.  We  consider  two  types  of  constraints  on  the  regulator’s  choice: 
technical constraints and ethical constraints. Technical constraints on policy instruments are 
due  to  behavioural  heterogeneity,  lack  of  relevant  information  or  transaction  costs  for 
adjusting targets and instruments. We assume that these constraints restrict the regulator’s 
choice set to ‘fixed’ -  non optimal - instruments (Ko et al, 1992).  In  contrast to optimal 
instruments, fixed instruments are characterized by constant policy parameters all along the 
temporal  horizon.  Nevertheless,  even  with  fixed  instruments  the  first  best  withdrawal 
trajectory can be achieved. Ethical constraints however put more stringent restrictions on the 
policy choice set. Take the example of the ambient tax and assume that all agents do not 
behave  rationally.  Whenever  total  withdrawals  are  off  the  target  trajectory,  all  agents  are 
liable  to  pay  a  fine  even  if  they  did  not  free  ride.  Such  instruments  might  therefore  be 
politically or ethically unacceptable with the implication that the first best withdrawal path 
can no longer be achieved. In this paper, we assume that the regulator is might be constrained 
to  implement  instruments  that  achieve  only  a  second  best  extraction  path.  We  consider 
therefore two types of fixed instruments in this paper: first best fixed instruments when only   3 
technical constraints restrict the regulator’s choice set and second best fixed instruments when 
also ethical constraints apply.  
 
We  provide  an  experimental  evaluation  of  alternative  policies  to  cope  with  the  dynamic 
externalities generated by the exploitation of a renewable common-pool resource. The reason 
why we chose to rely on an experimental approach is that most of these instruments have not 
yet been implemented in the field. Our paper relates to the work of Herr et al (1997) which 
compares the efficiency of the exploitation of a non-renewable common-pool resource that 
generates either only static externalities or both dynamic and static externalities. Their results 
witness for the increased inefficiency of the resource exploitation when a dynamic framework 
is considered. We implement a similar experimental protocol and introduce three extensions 
to their work: (i) the common-pool resource is renewable, (ii) we consider only dynamic 
externalities, and (iii) we evaluate policy instruments to correct the inefficiencies. The two 
first extensions rely on empirical considerations. Actually, many common-pool resources are 
renewable (e.g. fisheries, forests, aquifers) and depending on some intrinsic characteristics 
their  exploitation  may  or  not  generate  intra-period  external  costs.  We  compare  three 
alternative non optimal instruments: (i) a fixed tax rate on declared extractions combined with 
a compliance monitoring mechanism (flat tax); (ii) the ambient tax based on Segerson (1988) 
with fixed tax rates and fixed targets (ambient tax); and (iii) a mixed instrument combining 
the two previous instruments based on Kritikos (2004), (mixed flat instrument). We consider 
three  kinds  of  benchmark  behavior  -myopic,  rational  and  optimum-  and  discuss  the 
corresponding symmetric solutions of the dynamic game, respectively, the per-period Nash 
equilibrium  outcome,  the  sub-game  perfect  equilibrium  outcome,  and  the  joint  profit 
maximizing outcome. Under myopic behaviour the optimization horizon is restricted to one 
period; withdrawers do not consider the impact of their actual extractions on their own future 
profits. The myopic player assumes that all other players behave myopically, and therefore a 
Nash equilibrium is calculated for each period. Under rational behaviour, farsighted selfish 
withdrawers internalize the impact of their current extraction decision but just on their own 
future returns. Sub-game perfection is the solution concept applied to this game. The optimum 
outcome consists in the decision that maximizes the sum of all withdrawers’ profit for the 
whole  temporal  horizon.  On  the  optimum  extraction  path,  no  externalities  are  generated. 
However, in this kind of social dilemmas this strategy is dominated. 
 
We summarize our main findings as follows. Subjects behave myopically in the unregulated 
situation, which agrees with previous results in the literature. Conditional on predictions, the 
mixed  flat  instrument  and  the  flat  tax  are  the  most  effective  policies  in  approaching  the 
optimum extraction path. However, in absolute terms the ambient flat tax and the mixed flat 
instrument  curb  most  significantly  the  mean  extraction  path  towards  the  optimum  path. 
Paradoxically, these instruments are the less efficient ones. In our dynamic game stock saving 
implies forgone earnings that must be “cashed” in future periods by extracting the optimal 
quantities, otherwise losses become significant. This suggests that care must be paid in the 
practical  implementation  of  time  inconsistent  instruments,  since  early  deviations  from 
predictions alter the incentives set by each policy, either encouraging non optimal behaviour 
or just confusing subjects with distorted signals. 
 
Section 2 introduces the dynamic exploitation game of a renewable common pool resource. 
The predicted path for each behavioural assumption is derived and the corresponding policy 
instruments are discussed. Section 3 introduces the experimental design and the predicted 
paths obtained with our parametric choice. Section 4 exposes the results: firstly, the fitting of   4 
the data to the theoretical predictions, and secondly the efficiency and effectiveness of each 
policy instrument. Section 5 concludes.   
 
 
2.  A Discrete Dynamic Game of Common Pool Resources’ Exploitation 
 
Our experiment is based on a discrete finite time dynamic game of CPR exploitation. We first 
introduce the model before discussing possible solutions depending on alternative behavioural 
assumptions. 
 
Assume that N identical appropriators, indexed by i, extract units from a common resource in 
each period, t = 1,…,T. The resource is characterized at each period t, by a stock of available 
units. In period t appropriator i withdraws the quantity
t
i y . The evolution of the resource stock 
is described by equation (1): 
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where, 
t S is the stock of available units of the resource in the beginning of period t,r  is the 
natural per period recharge






t y Y is the total extraction in period t.  
 
According to Equation (1), the groundwater stock grows naturally
2 with the recharge and 
decrease with extractions. 
 
Extracted units generate a gross return to appropriator i in period t, given by: 
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where  0 , > b a . 
 
The average extraction cost from the CPR depends linearly on the available stock and on total 
extractions of the period: 
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where  0 ³ f , z , p . z measures the within period externality, and f measures the across period 
externality
3. Since there is free access to the resource, the period t profit of each appropriator 
(we drop the index i) is given by:  
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1 Note that we assume a constant recharge in our model. 
2 If there were no extractions the resource stock would grow indefinitely. A more complete specification of the 
resource dynamics should define a natural out-flow or disease rate.  
3 In many empirical situations only across-period externalities are present. For example, in the case of 
groundwater exploitation there is no reason to think that pumping on the same basin by two individuals remotely 
located, will mutually affect each other’s net return within a period (Brozovic, 2006).   5 
We  assume  that  appropriator  i’s  objective  function  in  each  period  t  is  to  maximize  the 
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i W be appropriator i’s accumulated wealth in 
period t: 
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where 
0
i W is appropriator i’s initial wealth. Appropriators may have different discount rates. 
Since we have no financial markets in the model, the interpretation is that appropriators’ 
preferences for the present are heterogeneous. For sake of simplicity we allow  i r to take just 
two values in the set { } 1 , 0 = R , which is assumed to be common knowledge. We call “myopic”, 
appropriators who totally discount future benefits, and “rational”, appropriators who do not 
discount  the  future.  Behaviourally  speaking  rational  appropriators  are  farsighted,  i.e.  they 
internalize the impact of their current extractions on their own future  profits.  In  contrast, 




2.1 Laissez faire 
 
In a situation with no public intervention we derive different benchmark solutions for the 
extraction game. We consider three kinds of behaviour, which correspond to three symmetric 
solutions of the game
4: the sub-game perfect equilibrium outcome (farsighted appropriators), 
the  myopic  outcome  (myopic  appropriators),  and  the  joint  profit  maximization  outcome 
(cooperators).  Let  us  call  these  benchmark  solutions  the  Rational,  Myopic  and  Optimum 
outcome, respectively. 
 
Rational appropriators internalize the impact of their current extractions on their own future 
profits. They define an optimal extraction plan, which is a best response to the other players’ 
optimal extraction plans. This extraction plan is called feedback strategy if it is a function of 
the available stock in each period t. Such a solution needs a particular information structure; 
appropriators must perfectly observe the available stock of the resource at the beginning of 
each period (Basar and Olsder, 1999), which allows them to adapt their extraction plan to 
every period’s conditions
5. Conversely, if appropriators do not observe in every period the 
available stock, but just the initial stock at the beginning of the game, they will not be able to 
periodically  adapt  their  extraction  plan.  In  that  case,  rational  appropriators  implement  an 
open-loop strategy (Basar and Olsder, 1999)
6. 
 
Under  the  assumption  of  myopic  behaviour,  the  optimization  horizon  is  restricted  to  one 
period. Each period the myopic appropriator calculates the profit maximizing extraction given 
the best responses of his rivals.  In each period of the game,  except the last one, myopic 
behaviour leads to higher extractions compared to rational behaviour, given the resource stock 
available  in  period  t.  Rational  appropriators  are  able  to  take  into  account  in  their  actual 
                                                 
4 Every appropriator in the population has the same time preferences and no preference reversals are allowed. 
5 There is no commitment on extraction decisions (see Levhari, D. and L. J. Mirman (1980), Levhari, D., R. 
Michener, et al. (1981), Reinganum, J. and N. Stokey (1985) as examples of such strategies applied to modeling 
the fisheries exploitation). 
6 Hence, there is full commitment to a fixed extraction path.   6 
decision the future periods’ natural recharge of the available stock. The larger the natural 
recharge the greater is the gap between rational and myopic extractions trajectories.  
  
The optimum outcome is derived by maximizing the aggregate profit of all appropriators’ 
over the temporal horizon. The corresponding trajectory would be obtained by a benevolent 
regulator  or  by  perfect  cooperation  of  the  appropriators,  which  both  imply  joint  profit 
maximization. The optimum extraction path has a positive slope which is vanishing in the 
case where the natural recharge is null.  
 
The extraction game involves a social dilemma, since the cooperative outcome is a dominated 
strategy. We therefore investigate various policy instruments that could be implemented by a 





We consider a regulator who has the option to set financial incentives in order to implement 
the  cooperative  outcome  as  the  equilibrium  strategy  of  the  game.  We  assume  that  the 
regulator  can  choose  among  three  alternative  first  best  instruments:  (i)  a  tax  on  declared 
extractions with a compliance monitoring mechanism; (ii) an ambient tax; and (iii) a mixed 
instrument combining the two previous instruments. 
 
The  optimal  tax  scheme  requires  two  properties:  zero  fraud  and  internalization  of  the 
appropriation  externalities  (static  and  dynamic).  The  optimal  individual  tax 
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*  depends on the available stock, the total extraction, the recharge, the 
individual  extraction  and  the  discount  rate.  The  resource  stock  and  the  natural  recharge 
increase  the  optimal  tax  rate  as  enhance  the  dynamic  externality.  On  the  contrary,  total 
extractions  reduce  the  optimal  tax  rate  because  they  shrink  the  dynamic  externality  by 
degrading future periods’ resource stocks. Individual extractions have two conflicting effects 
on the tax rate. On one hand, the tax rate increases with individual extractions to internalize 
the  associated  static  externality;  on  the  other  hand,  the  tax  rate  diminishes  as  individual 
extractions reduce the dynamic  externality in the same way than the total extractions do. 
Concerning  the  discount  rate,  myopic  appropriators face  a  higher  tax  rate  than  farsighted 
appropriators, for any resource stock and period (excepting the ending one). 
 
In order to monitor compliance the regulator can audit a fixed number of appropriators in each 
period.  We  assume  perfect  audit:  spot  controls  allow  the  regulator  to  observe  the  exact 
individual level of current extraction. Detected cheaters must pay a fixed penalty in addition 
to  their  tax  debt.  As  appropriators  do  not  know  who  has  been  audited  in  the  period,  all 
appropriators face the same audit probability. A risk neutral agent will avoid cheating if the 
penalty is equal to: 
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,                (6) 
  
where, p is the audit probability, 
t
i y ˆ is the ith appropriator declared extraction. The lower the 
audit probability the higher the penalty required to encourage compliance. However, if limited 
liability  constraints  prevent  high  penalties  to  be  enforced,  first  best  solution  may  not  be 
achievable.   7 
In  some  cases  appropriators  can  successfully  hide  extractions,  avoiding  penalties  after  a 
control. In such cases tax schemes are inefficient, and an instrument based on total extraction, 
if observable, might be indicated. Following Segerson (1988) a first best extraction path can 
be attained by implementing in each period an unbalanced collective penalty of the form: 
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Where 
* t S is the first best resource stock at the end of period t. With this instrument every 
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* =  introduces optimal incentives to first best extractions, implying that none 
of  the  appropriators  is  penalized  at  equilibrium.  However,  the  ambient  tax  has  many 
drawbacks  (Kritikos,  2004).  In  order  to  avoid  tax  payments  some  appropriators  may 
compensate  excessive  extractions  of  free  riders  resulting  in  multiplicity  of  equilibria.  If 
coordination fails, innocent appropriators will be wrongly punished. Additionally, if penalties 
are high enough, limited liability constraints will prevent the ambient tax to be enforced on 
some appropriators and the first best solution will not be achieved. 
 
The  mixed  instrument  results  from  the  combination  of  the  previously  described  policies 
(Kritikos  2004).  Under  this  policy,  appropriators  pay  taxes  on  declared  extractions  and  a 
collective  penalty  is  levied  if  total  declared  extractions  differ  from  the  total  extraction 
observed by the regulator. Furthermore, the regulator performs random in situ controls to 
track for cheating appropriators who must pay their tax debt and the collective penalty while 
the compliant appropriators are freed of paying the collective penalty. 
 
The mixed instrument achieves the first best extraction path as a unique equilibrium, avoiding 
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2.2.1 Policy choice 
 
The  practical  implementation  of  any  of  the  previously  described  instruments  is  costly; 
designing  individual  tax  rates  and  adjusting  them  each  period,  identification  of  the 
appropriators’ type, compliance monitoring and observation of relevant variables are costly 
activities. In practice the regulator has a limited budget to achieve the first best solution. 
Additionally,  the  regulator  might  be  restricted  in the  policy  choice  by  legal  and  political 
considerations.  Furthermore,  instruments  might  be  adapted  to  ensure  in  each  period  a 
minimum profit to appropriators. 
 
Let us suppose that the regulator cannot afford the identification of the appropriators’ types 
nor  the  adjustment  of  the  instruments’  parameters  from  one  period  to  another.  The 
instruments are therefore implemented with uniform and fixed parameters, i.e. the tax rate 
would be the same for every appropriator’s type and won’t be adjusted over time. It can be 
shown that under certain conditions the previously described instruments, with uniform and 
fixed parameters, can successfully implement the first best extraction path (Giordana 2007).   8 
 
2.2.2 Transformed policy instruments 
 
(i)  Flat tax 
 
We call flat tax a policy instrument resulting from the combination of a tax scheme (described 
in section 2.2) with a uniform and a fixed tax rate, and a subsidy equal to the tax payments if 
extractions are less than the first best extractions. Under the flat tax appropriators will pay a 
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  where, 
* t y is the period t first best extraction resulting from an open-loop strategy. 
 
If t is sufficiently high and there is total compliance, the flat tax can achieve the first best 
solution and no tax is levied in that case. Compliance is monitored in the same way described 
for the tax scheme (section 2.2). 
 
 
(ii)  Ambient flat tax 
 
We call ambient flat tax the ambient tax defined by equation (7) but with a uniform and a 
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(iii)  Mixed flat instrument 
 
This instrument is similar to the mixed instrument described in section 2.2, but the tax rate is 




Under any of these transformed policy instruments the first best solution is attainable if the 
tax rates are correctly calibrated. Additionally, no tax is levied at equilibrium. Thus, myopic 
and  farsighted  appropriators  will  remain  on  the  optimal  extraction  path  (the  optimum 
outcome). However, if the regulator is constrained to fix a tax rate smaller than the optimal 
one (as a consequence  of political considerations), the optimum extraction path will be a 
dominated strategy. Then, under any of the flat instruments, each appropriator type (myopic 
and farsighted) will have different optimal feedbacks. 
   9 
3.  Experimental Design 
 
The  experimental  protocol  was  designed  to  capture  the  fundamental  aspects  of  the  game 
described by equations (1)-(5). In each period, subjects decide the amount of “units” to extract 
from an account. Given the parameterization (see Table 1), in each period a subject earns 
experimental points depending on his/her unit order and on the available units in the account 
at the beginning of that period. We run 4 treatments: “Laissez-faire” (LF hereafter), which 
corresponds to the benchmark treatment without any policy instrument, the Flat Tax treatment 
(FT hereafter), the Ambient Flat Tax treatment (AFT hereafter) and the Mixed Flat Instrument 
treatment (MFI thereafter). The dynamic extraction game is played over 10 periods.  
 
 
  Treatments 
 
  Laissez 
faire (LF)  Flat tax (FT)  Mixed flat instrument 
(MFI)  Ambient flat tax (AFT) 
Group size 
(N)  5 
Benefit 
function 
a = 5.3 































faire (LF)  Flat tax (FT)  Mixed flat instrument 
(MFI)  Ambient flat tax (AFT) 
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Table 1: Experimental parametric restrictions on the extraction model 
 
 
In order to reduce the complexity of the decision environment some simplifications have been 
introduced. Explicitly, no distinction was made between orders revenues and costs. Subjects 
knew only the net outcome of their withdrawal decision. Additionally, the individual penalty 
in the FT and MFI treatments was deeply simplified (Table 1). We have replaced in the 
penalty function (equation 6), the ith appropriator extractions (
t
i y ) by the period t optimal   10 
feedback of myopic appropriators ( ) ( )
t t
m S y
7, and the ith appropriator declared extractions (
t
i y ˆ ) 
by  zero.  In  this  way  the  individual  penalty  in  each  period  reduces  to  a  function  of  the 
available stock, becoming a lump-sum penalty. These simplifications were introduced to ease 





Figures 1, 2 and 3 plot the extraction path of the myopic, rational and optimum strategies
8. In 
the LF treatment, the extraction paths are clearly different for each strategy. While the myopic 
extraction  path  is  decreasing  (large  amounts  extracted  in  early  periods  due  to  impatient 
behaviour) the rational extraction path is quite stable. The strength of the “social dilemma” is 
at its maximum in the first periods as the optimum extraction path has a positive slope. Taking 
the optimum strategy as an efficiency benchmark
9, the myopic and rational strategies achieve, 
respectively, 74% and 51.8% of efficiency with respect to the benchmark.  
 
The predictions for the FT and MFI are similar (Figure 2). The optimum prediction is the 
same as in the LF treatment (Figure 1). As can be seen, the myopic and rational strategies 
extraction paths approach the optimum, although not completely, compared to laissez faire. 
But there are large gaps in the first four periods and the last two periods. The rational and 
myopic strategies achieve, respectively 89.4% and 76% of gross efficiency. However, the 
efficiency  net  of  taxes  is  smaller,  61.4%  and  42.3%  respectively.  Actually,  appropriators 
withdraw more than the optimum strategy, and pay the corresponding tax, because the tax rate 
is too low and compliance is ensured by the individual and collective penalties. 
 
The strength of the “social dilemma” is smallest in the AFT treatment, as the extraction paths 
are closest to the optimum path. As a consequence, the predicted gross efficiency of this 
treatment  outperforms  the  FT  and  MFI  treatments.  The  rational  and  myopic  strategies 
achieve, respectively 92% and 81.6%. Conversely, the net efficiency under the AFT is lowest. 
The rational strategy achieves 54.4% of net efficiency. The predicted accumulated wealth net 
of taxes under the myopic strategy is negative (net efficiency of -20.4%). Again the low tax 
rate  fails  to  encourage  myopic  appropriators  to  refrain  their  withdrawals.  Rational 
appropriators triplicate the myopic performance because they consider the impact of actual 
withdrawals on the size of the future collective penalty. Since the target path and the stock 
recharge are fixed for the whole temporal horizon, excessive orders in early periods may 
cause irreversible deviations from the target path in the future. Then, even if total orders are 




3.2 Experimental Implementation 
 
All experimental sessions were conducted at the University of Montpellier 1 using the z-Tree  
computer  programme  (Fischbacher,  2007).  Subjects  were  recruited  from  the  pool  of 
                                                 
7 We assume that the entire population behaves myopically. 
8 Predictions are calculated for each treatment assuming that all appropriators in the population follow the same 
strategy, i.e. rational, myopic or optimum strategies. 
9 We define efficiency as the wealth that has been accumulated until the end of period T under a particular 
strategy with respect to the optimum strategy.   11 
undergraduate students of LEEM
10. None of the subjects had ever participated in a similar 
experiment. Most recruitment was done by e-mail. Subjects were invited to participate in an 
experimental game lasting approximately one and a half hour, and were told that they will 
receive a cash payment based on their decisions and the decisions of the group (in addition to 
a show-up fee). 




























      Figure 1: Predictions of the laissez-faire treatment. 
 




























      Figure 2: Predictions of the FT and MFI treatments. 
                                                 
10 Laboratory of Experimental Economics of Montpellier.   12 




























      Figure 3: Predictions of the AFT treatment. 
 
At least two independent groups of 5 subjects participated in each session. Subjects were 
assigned  to  separate  boxes  on  a  random  basis.  Communication  was  not  allowed.  At  the 
beginning of a session, subjects first read individually the paper instructions, which were read 
aloud by an assistant after individual reading. Understanding was checked individually by a 
questionnaire
11. No practice rounds were performed. 
 
In each session, subjects participated in four repetitions of a ten-period dynamic game. We 
called  this  repetitions  series  1,  2,  3  and  4.  Subjects  were  given  a  show-up  fee  that  was 
calculated to cover eventual losses. Prior to series 1, subjects were assigned to groups of five 
players  without  being  told  the  identity  of  the  other  group  members.  The  composition  of 
groups  remained  the  same  during  the  whole  experimental  session.  The  same  treatment 
condition was kept during the four series. 
 
 
3.3 Decision Setting 
 
In  each  period,  subjects  choose  independently  and  simultaneously  the  amount  of  units  to 
extract.  Individual  unit  orders  were  restricted  to  values  in  the  range
12  [ ] 50 , 0 .  In  every 
treatment  subjects  disposed  of  two  tables.  The  first  table  shows  the  return  of  various 
combinations of the available units in the account and unit orders (in the allowable range). 
Since we could not provide a complete table for all possible combinations, subjects were 
given a partial table as well as the formulae that were used to calculate the profit. The second 
table indicated the target of each period: the targeted stocks for the AFT treatment, and the 
individual extractions cut-off levels for the FT and MFI treatments.  Moreover, in the  FT 
treatment  an  additional  table  was  provided  showing  the  lump-sum  penalties.  Profits  and 
penalties were expressed in “experimental points”, and subjects were aware of the conversion 
rate of points into Euros. 
 
The size of the group and the profit function were common knowledge. At the beginning of 
each period, subjects were informed of their accumulated wealth and of the available units in 
                                                 
11 During the questionnaire filling subjects were allowed to ask questions individually to the assistants. 
12 Even if unit orders were not restricted to be integers, all participants have ordered integer amounts.   13 
the account. After each decision period subjects were informed about their own profits for that 
period.  A  “summary  table”  of  the  series  was  available,  with  information  about  previous 
periods’ accumulated wealth, net return, unit order, and the available units in the account. 
 
 
4.  Results 
 
We run two sessions by treatment, involving the participation of 15 subjects each, excepting 
one session of the MFI treatment where only 10 subjects participated. Data of a total of 23 
groups and 92 series (at the group level) were collected. 
 
We call “unconditional benchmarks” the predictions described in figures 1, 2 and 3 because 
they  rely  on  the  common  assumption  that  each  subject  behaves  as  predicted.  As  current 
decisions depend on the actual history of the game which can differ from the predicted path, 
new  benchmark  outcomes  (depending  on  history)  must  be  calculated.  We  call  them 
“conditional benchmarks”. 
 
We  first  analyze  the  fitting  of  individual  data  to  the  benchmarks.  This  allows  us  to 
appropriately perform afterwards the assessment of the policy instruments efficiency. Under 
non optimal policy instruments, alternative behavioural assumptions (rational, myopic and 
optimum)  lead  to  different  predictions.  To  assess  correctly  the  efficiency  of  a  policy  the 
population type must be known.  
 
Tables 2 to 5 show the mean squared deviation (MSD) of individual data with respect to the 
unconditional  benchmarks  and  in  brackets  the  limits  of  the  bootstrap  intervals  at  95%  of 
confidence (if the intervals overlap the differences are not significant at the 5% significance 
level). The MSD of individual data with respect to the conditional benchmarks are shown on 
the right side of each table. 
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Figures 4 to 7 plot the mean withdrawals with their bootstrap intervals at 95% of confidence 
and  the  conditional  predictions  of  the  theoretical  strategies  for  each  policy  treatment 
respectively, as well as the mean withdrawals of the laissez faire treatment. 
 
 
4.1 Comparison of behavioural hypotheses 
 
 
RESULT 1: In the laissez-faire treatment the myopic strategy is the best fitting strategy. 
 
As can be seen from Table 2, the optimum strategy MSD with respect to the unconditional 
benchmark is significantly the largest one. Whilst the unconditional MSD does not allow 
distinguishing between the rational and the myopic behaviours, the MSD with respect to the 
conditional  benchmarks  indicates  that  the  myopic  strategy  is  the  best  fitting  one.  The 
conditional MSD of the myopic strategy is significantly lower than the rational strategy one 
(p-value  =  0.0656;  Friedman  test).  As  shown  in  Figure  4,  the  mean  extraction  path  is 
significantly lower than the myopic conditional benchmark and significantly higher than the 
rational conditional benchmark. Thus, mean extractions seem to back a mixed population of   14 
myopic and rational agents. However, until period seven the mean extraction path resembles 
rather  to  the  myopic  benchmark  than  to  the  rational  one,  thereafter  we  are  unable  to 
distinguish between these strategies. Detailed analysis on individual extractions must to be 
performed to clarify this point. 
 


































  Unconditional benchmarks  Conditional benchmarks 
Strategy  Rational  Myopic  Optimum  Rational  Myopic  Optimum 
Mean 
[95% intervals]             
Series             
1 
375.51 
[197.16  586.51] 
382.91 
[200.59  596.89] 
1010 
[797.93 1265.6]  440.9  381.4  1046.6 
             
2 
191.19 
[81.02  215.89] 
150.65 
[82.43  229.62] 
744.86 
[686.68  807.48]  213.9  181.4  764.9 
             
3 
188.89 
[62.14  360.24 
189.5 
[65.84  360.81] 
849.5 
[690.27 1045.13]  286.2  200.2  894.2 
             
4 
65.11 
[31.22  119.67] 
63.49 
[31.08  112.04] 
746.11 
[668.16  843.21]  154.4  70.8  750.3 




[128.67  264.53] 
196.64 
[134.6  268.85] 
837.62 
[759.32  926.16]  273.84  208.44  864.01 
Table 2: Mean Squared Deviation for the LF treatment. 
 
 
RESULT 2: In the flat tax treatment any benchmark successfully explains the data. 
 
Inspection of Table 3 reveals that no significant differences exist between the rational and the 
myopic strategy as measured by MSD with respect to the unconditional benchmarks. Besides 
that the myopic strategy shows the lower MSD with respect to the conditional benchmark, we 
cannot conclude that it is the best fitting one. As shown in Figure 5, mean withdrawals are   15 
significantly different compared to the myopic conditional benchmark until period 8. In the 
later  periods  they  remain  above  the  rational  conditional  benchmark,  but  the  difference 
between the benchmarks are not sufficient to conclude that the myopic strategy better fits the 
data. 
 
































  Unconditional benchmarks  Conditional benchmarks 
Strategy  Rational  Myopic  Optimum  Rational  Myopic  Optimum 
Mean 
[95% intervals]             
Series             
1 
1164.69 
[728.1  1654.7] 
997.53 
[591.4  1444.5] 
1584.27 
[1072.5  2167.5]  1442.1  1249.8  1840.6 
             
2 
343.64 
[245.57  475.09] 
226.74 
[162.88  317.68] 
692.05 
[539.78  876.73]  370.7  249.5  708.8 
             
3 
288.57 
[227.19  362.52] 
177.11 
[132.67  235.03] 
621.97 
[513.09  738.56]  310.7  184.6  662.1 
             
4 
262.04 
[225.69  304.34] 
147.74 
[122.18  177.31] 
589.5 
[512.41  672.87]  295.5  173.0  638.4 




[405.12  645.54] 
387.28 
[285.73  504.38] 
871.95 
[734.5  1032.4] 
604.7  464.2  962.5 
Table 3: Mean Squared Deviation for the FT treatment. 
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RESULT 3: In the ambient flat tax treatment the myopic strategy is the best fitting strategy. 
 
Whilst the MSD with respect to the unconditional benchmarks indicates that the optimum 
strategy does not explain mean extractions, we cannot identify the best fitting among the two 
remaining strategies with this criterion. Nevertheless, the myopic conditional benchmark is 
the best fitting strategy as measured by the MSD with respect to the conditional benchmarks 
(p-value = 0.0163; Friedman test). Figure 6 shows that the difference between the myopic 
prediction  and  the  mean  withdrawals  is  significant  until  period  6.  Besides,  the  mean 
extractions trajectory seems to follow the myopic trajectory. 
 



























Figure 6 : Mean withdrawals in LF and AFT treatment versus AFT conditional benchmarks. 
 
AFT treatment 
  Unconditional benchmarks  Conditional benchmarks 
Strategy  Rational  Myopic  Optimum  Rational  Myopic  Optimum 
Mean 
[95% intervals]             
Series             
1 
677.61 
[487.23  868.23] 
706.34 
[516.51  902.13] 
1082.6 
[894.6  1286.3]  1136.6  870.9  1137.3 
             
2 
740.23 
[503.07  993.97] 
781.89 
[536.55  1030.2] 
1100.83 
[807.31  1435.6]  1066.3  850.3  1095.2 
             
3 
476.49 
[322.09  708.4] 
532.91 
[375.88  759.56] 
686.06 
[485.62  970.24]  666.5  519.6  696.8 
             
4 
285.97 
[202.2  374.1] 
323.20 
[232.7  419.88] 
655.39 
[545.28  780.07]  597.4  378.4  624.0 




[453.1  642.09] 
586.08 
[493.16  681.26] 
881.22 
[768.24  995.99] 
866.7  654.8  888.3 
Table 4: Mean Squared Deviation for the AFT treatment. 
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RESULT 4: In the mixed flat instrument treatment the myopic and the rational strategies are 
equally well fitting the data. 
 
Likewise in the treatments analysed previously, the optimum strategy’s MSD with respect to 
the unconditional benchmark is significantly the largest one. However, under MFI neither the 
unconditional MSD nor the conditional MSD allows us to point out which strategy, myopic or 
rational, better explains the data (p-value = 0.1495; Friedman test). However, figure 7 clearly 
shows that mean withdrawals are significantly similar to the myopic benchmark, excepting in 
periods where the myopic and the rational conditional predictions overlap, i.e. periods 4, 5 
and  6.  This  may  suggests  that  mean  withdrawals  are  generated  by  a  mix  of  rational 
withdrawers who reacted to the instrument as expected and withdrawers who ignored the 
instrument. 



























Figure 7 : Mean withdrawals in LF and MFI treatment versus MFI conditional benchmarks. 
 
Treatment MFI 
  Unconditional benchmarks  Conditional benchmarks 
Strategy  Rational  Myopic  Optimum  Rational  Myopic  Optimum 
Mean 
[95% intervals]             
Series             
1 
520.86 
[324.11  729.91] 
415.18 
[238.15  597.63] 
869.29 
[640.3  1145.0]  591.3  466.2  962.4 
             
2 
604.14 
[333.79  903.32] 
554.65 
[266.57  872.67] 
855.09 
[602.5  1133.7]  781.3  718.0  1117.8 
             
3 
480.25 
[253.84  739.61] 
387.58 
[193.31  615.24] 
805.29 
[527.6  1135.6]  525.1  431.8  872.0 
             
4 
217.82 
[170.04  274.75] 
195.46 
[147.60  246.92] 
444.43 
[343.34  555.81]  246.8  228.5  519.3 




[351.5  579.1] 
388.22 
[286.75  508.64] 
743.53 
[626.67  880.84]  536.1  461.1  867.9 
Table 5: Mean Squared Deviation for the MFI treatment.   18 
4.2 Instrument efficiency assessment 
 
 
RESULT 5: The AFT and MFI policies significantly move extractions towards the optimum 
unconditional benchmark with respect to the laissez-faire observed extraction path. 
 
The  conditional  benchmarks  converge  to  the  same  extraction  level  in  the  last  period. 
Therefore the incentive instruments must achieve a reduction of extractions in early periods of 
the  temporal  horizon  to  be  effective.  The  withdrawal  trajectory  of  those  instruments  that 
succeed have a positive slope, and cross the LF mean withdrawals trajectory in the same way 
that the myopic prediction crosses the optimum trajectory in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 5 shows that the FT does not achieve a significant shift of the extraction trajectory 
towards  the  optimum.  Although  the  trajectories  cross  each  other  the  differences  are  not 
significant except in period 9.  Additionally, the MSD of the optimum strategy under the flat 
tax (Table 3) does not show any significant reduction with respect to the LF treatment (Table 
2). From Figure 7 it can be seen that the MFI accomplishes a significant move towards the 
optimum unconditional benchmark; the trajectories clearly cross each other. However, this is 
not supported by the comparison of the MSD of the optimum strategy with the LF treatment. 
The AFT achieves the most important extraction reduction in early periods (Figure 6), but 
extractions remain stable over the horizon. 
 
Cheating could be an explanation for the poor performance of the FT instrument in moving 
the extraction trajectory toward the optimum. Under AFT cheating is irrelevant since there are 
not withdrawals declarations, and in the MFI the group fraud is always detected, though it is 
not  always  individually  punished.  However,  in  the  FT  the  random  audit  the  agents  may 
underestimate the expected penalty and be encouraged to cheat. 
 
 
RESULT 6: In the FT treatment, cheating explains the deviations with respect to the myopic 
conditional benchmark. 
 
In order to support result 6, let us define a new extraction path generated by a population 
containing a mix of “cheaters” and compliant agents. In a given period we assume that a 
cheating agent declares zero extraction, but withdraws from the account as if the tax rate was 
null.  On  the  other  hand,  a  compliant  agent  behaves  according  to  the  myopic  conditional 
prediction. The mix changes over time since a compliant agent might become a cheater, while 
a cheater might become compliant. Expression (12) describes the extraction path generated by 
the mixed population. We call it “X prediction” thereafter. Note that if the population is fully 
compliant the “X prediction” overlaps with the myopic conditional benchmark.  
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , 1 ,
t t
m
t t t t
m
t t
x S y S y y × - + × = g t g           (12)  
 
Where 
t g is the compliance rate in period t,   ( )
t t t
m S y t ,  is the myopic conditional benchmark 
given the stock 
t S and the tax rate
t t , and  ( ) 0 ,
t t
m S y  is the myopic conditional benchmark of 
the laissez faire situation. 
   19 
Figure  8  plots  the  mean  extractions,  the  myopic  conditional  benchmark,  and  the  “X 
prediction”  defined  above.  As  can  be  seen  the  “X  prediction”  fits  quite  well  the  mean 
extractions in the FT. It does not differ significantly from the mean extractions except in the 
first series of groups 1, 5 and 6. 
 
 
RESULT 7: The contrast between the FT and the MFI policies reveals that the collective 
penalty achieves higher compliance than the lump-sum penalty. 
 
Figure 9 reports the mean compliance rates, defined as the ratio of the declared to the real 
extractions, and the bootstrap intervals at 95% of confidence for the FT and MFI for each 
period. Significant differences are observed for periods 1, 4, 6, 7, 9 and 10.Thus, results 5, 6 





































































































































X Prediction Cond. Myopic Prediction Mean withdrawals 95% Conf. Intervals
 
Figure 8 : Mean extractions, myopic conditional benchmark and X Prediction by group and series for the 
FT treatment. 
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Figure 9 : Mean compliance rate and 95% confidence bootstrap intervals for FT and MFI treatments. 
 
 
As  a  general  result  the  tested  policies  were  unsuccessful.  The  MSD  with  respect  to  the 
optimum unconditional benchmark remains very high in every policy treatment and takes 
similar values to those of the LF treatment. Besides, their effectiveness can be assessed and 
compared. 
 
We perform comparisons of instruments by using an effectiveness indicator. Deviations of the 
observed  extractions  with  respect  to  the  optimum  trajectory  cannot  be  directly  used  as  a 
measure of effectiveness because conditional predictions differ depending on the evolution of 
the stock. Therefore, we normalize the deviation by the conditional prediction of the “strength 
of the social dilemma” (SSD), which is measured as the absolute value of the difference 
between the optimum unconditional prediction (the target trajectory) and the myopic/rational 
conditional  predictions.  The  larger  the  SSD  the  higher  will  be  the  weight  in  terms  of 
effectiveness of each unit of differential reduction. The indicator of ineffectiveness is given 
by: 
 

























































i y y y y are respectively, the observed extractions of subject i, the myopic and 
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RESULT 8: Under the assumption of myopic behaviour for all players, the most effective 
instruments are the MFI and the FT. 
 
On  the  basis  of  the  effectiveness  indicator  for  a  myopic  population,  we  reject  the  null 
hypothesis that all samples are drawn from the same distribution
13 (p-value 0.000; Friedman 
test). The effectiveness mean indicator of the mixed flat instrument is equal to 0.1642, which 
is significantly higher than the effectiveness mean indicator of the ambient flat tax, equal to 
0.0647 (p-value = 0.000; Friedman test). No significant difference exist with the flat tax, the 
effectiveness indicator being equal to 0.1523 (p-value = 0.4233; Friedman test). Additionally, 
the AFT is significantly less effective than the FT (p-value = 0.000; Friedman test). 
 
 












Mean column rank    
Figure 10 : Policy effectiveness comparisons; myopic population. 
 
In order to avoid excessive inference errors, we carry out a multi-comparison test based on 
Tukey's honestly significant difference criterion
14. Panel (a) of Figure 8 shows that the mean 
rank of the AFT is significantly smaller than for MFI (5% significance level), but there is no 
significant difference between AFT and FT. However at the 10% significance level we found 
the result of the individual comparisons described in the previous paragraph (panel (b) of 
                                                 
13 For the MFI we have only 5 independent groups. Since the Friedman test requires balanced samples we 
duplicated randomly one group of the MFI treatment. In this case samples contain 24 observations:  4 series per 
group and 6 groups in each treatment. 
14 The test was implemented by the multcompare function of the Matlab 6.5 Statistical toolbox.   22 
Figure 5). Both panels of Figure 8 also show that FT is less effective than MFI. This is backed 
by the MSD observation that the MFI policy is closer to the optimum than the FT policy 
(Tables 5 and 3, respectively). 
 
Result 8 contrasts sharply with result 5. This is due to the predicted differences in the strength 
of the social dilemma (SSD) that modifies the weighting of the deviations in the effectiveness 
indicator (equation 13). For example, in the case of a myopic population the SSD is given by 
the difference between the myopic conditional benchmark and the optimum unconditional 
benchmark. From figures 6 and 7 it can be seen that in period 1 the SSD under FT and MFI is 
twice the SSD of AFT. Consequently, under the assumption of a rational population, the 
policy  effectiveness  comparison  may  provide  different  results  because  the  SSD  predicted 
values for each policy differs compared to the myopic population case. 
 
 
RESULT  9:  Under  the  assumption  of  rational  behaviour  for  all  players,  all  policies  are 
equally effective. 
 
As for the case of a myopic population, we reject the null hypothesis that all samples are 
drawn from the same distribution (p-value = 0.0731; Friedman test). The effectiveness mean 
indicator of the MFI is equal to 0.1634 and is significantly higher than the effectiveness mean 
indicator of the AFT, which is equal to 0.1271 (p-value = 0.0306; Friedman test). The flat tax 
effectiveness mean indicator is equal to 0.1508 and does not show a significant difference 
with the MFI indicator (p-value = 0.5218; Friedman test) nor with the AFT indicator (p-value 
= 0.1093; Friedman test).  
 
In contrast to the myopic case, the AFT effectiveness indicator is much higher here. The 
multi-comparison  test  does  not  show  any  significant  difference  in  the  effectiveness  mean 
indicator  (Figure  9).  Thus,  the  results  of  the  individual  comparisons  are  not  supported 
preventing us to point out the most effective policy. 
 




Mean Column Rank  
Figure 11 : Policy effectiveness comparisons; rational population. 
 
This divergence highlights the importance of the behavioural rules which characterise the 
target  population  for  the  design  and  evaluation  of  incentive  policy  instruments.  Our 
instruments  are  not  individual-specific  since  they  are  uniformly  applied  to  the  entire 
population. Our results clearly show that the predicted efficiency differs sharply depending on   23 
the population type. Thus, the evaluation of an incentive policy performance may result in 
opposite conclusions depending on what we expect from an instrument. 
 
 
RESULT 10: The flat tax is the most efficient policy and the ambient flat tax is the less 
efficient, in gross and net terms. 
 
Table 6 shows the efficiency of each treatment. Gross efficiency is measured as the ratio of 
the  accumulated  wealth  at  the  end  of  the  game  and  the  optimum  strategy  wealth 
(unconditional prediction). The net efficiency is measured in the same way that the gross 
efficiency but the tax and penalty payments are deduced from the accumulated wealth. 
 
On the basis of gross efficiency FT is close to the LF. Combined to result 2, it seems that the 
FT instrument was completely ignored by the subjects. But result 8 does not support this 
conclusion. Paradoxically, the instruments that were most successful to curb the extraction 
path  towards  the  optimum  path,  the  MFI  and  the  AFT as  stated  in  result  5,  are  the  less 
efficient  ones.  In  our  dynamic  game  stock  saving  implies  forgone  earnings  that  must  be 
“cashed”  in  future  periods  by  extracting  the  optimal  quantities,  otherwise  losses  become 
significant. This is likely to have happened under the AFT and MFI instruments. Figures 6 
and 7 show that the resource stock was respectively under and over exploited in the final 
periods with respect to predictions. Thus, care must be paid in implementing time inconsistent 
instruments, since early deviations from predictions alter the incentives set by each policy, 
either encouraging non optimal behaviour or just confusing subjects with distorted signals. 
Anyhow, deeper analysis on individual decisions must be performed to assess more accurately 
the impact of time inconsistency. 
 
All policy instruments performed quite badly in terms of net efficiency (Table 6). The large 
differences in the net efficiency just indicate the strength of audit and penalty systems to 
assure compliance. 
 





























5.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper we tested experimentally three alternative non optimal policies to cope with 
dynamic externalities. We considered policies designed for managing the exploitation of a 
renewable common-pool resource when the time horizon is finite and individual withdrawals 
are unobservable by the regulator.   24 
In a dynamic framework, policy parameters must change from one period to the other to adapt 
to  the  resource  state  and  to  the  remaining  time.  In  order  to  correctly  internalize  the 
externalities, the tax rate, the penalties, and the targets need to be adjusted to the new state of 
the  resource.  Because  the  practical  implementation  of  such  flexible  policies  is  generally 
unfeasible, because of technical and ethical constraints, we considered that the regulator is 
restricted to implement ‘fixed’ non optimal instruments, i.e. policy parameters remain fixed 
all along the temporal horizon. While fix instruments are time inconsistent, they still may be 
able to implement the first best extraction path.  
 
We  compared  three  alternative  non  optimal  instruments:  (i)  a  fix  rate  tax  on  declared 
extractions with a compliance monitoring mechanism (flat tax, FT treatment), (ii) an ambient 
tax  with  fixed  tax  rates  and  targets  (ambient  flat  tax,  AFT  treatment),  and  (iii)  a  mixed 
instrument (mixed flat instrument, MFI treatment) combining the two previous instruments. 
All  three  instruments  share  the  particularity  that  if  extractions  are  lower  or  equal  to  an 
exogenous target, the tax rate is null. While the targets are set at the individual level for FT 
and MFI, they are set at the group level for AFT. FT and MFI differ with respect to the 
compliance  monitoring  mechanism.  Under  FT  random  auditing  is  implemented  to  detect 
cheaters who must pay their tax debt and a lump-sum penalty. Under MFI a collective penalty 
is levied if total declared extractions differ from the total extraction observed by the regulator. 
Random controls are implemented to track for cheating appropriators who must pay their tax 
debt and the collective  penalty  while the compliant appropriators are freed of paying the 
collective penalty. 
 
The AFT and MFI succeed in moving significantly the mean extraction path towards the 
optimum  path,  compared  to  the  laissez  faire  mean  trajectory.  On  the  contrary,  the  FT 
instruments had no impact on subjects’ decisions, since the rate of compliance is very low 
under  this  instrument.  Actually,  the  collective  penalty  under  the  MFI  achieved  higher 
compliance  than  random  audit  with  lump-sum  penalty  implemented  in  the  FT.  Anyhow 
compliance achieved by the collective penalty remains under the prediction (no cheating). 
 
Additionally,  we  compared  the  instruments’  effectiveness  in  approaching  the  optimum 
trajectory, on the basis  of an indicator that takes into account the “strength of the social 
dilemma” (SSD). Roughly speaking, the SSD indicator corrects the difference between the 
observed trajectory with the instrument and the target trajectory by a measure of distance 
between the predicted trajectory with the instrument and the target trajectory. Two distinct 
comparisons were performed, corresponding respectively to a myopic behavioural hypothesis 
and to a rational behavioural hypothesis. No significant difference in effectiveness between 
instruments was found under the rational behavioural hypothesis. However, under myopic 
behaviour, AFT is the least effective instrument, in sharp contrast with the evidence exposed 
previously. This conclusion is attributable to the predicted differences in the strength of the 
social  dilemma  (SSD)  that  affects  the  weighting  of  the  deviations  in  the  effectiveness 
indicator.  The  divergence  highlights  the  importance  of  the  behavioural  rule  which 
characterises  the  target  population  for  the  design  and  evaluation  of  incentive  policy 
instruments. Our results clearly show that the predicted efficiency is strongly affected by the 
behavioural  assumption  about  the  relevant  population  of  players.  We  conclude  that  the 
expected performance of an instrument is strongly dependent on the agents’ behaviour. 
 
From  a  practical  point  of  view,  our  results  suggest  that  the  implementation  of  time 
inconsistent policy-instruments must be made very cautiously. We found that that the most 
successful instruments for shifting the extraction path towards the optimum path (i.e. MFI and   25 
AFT) are the less efficient ones. In the dynamic game we have tested, a stock saving implies 
forgone earnings that must be “cashed” in future periods by extracting the optimal quantities, 
otherwise losses will become significantly high. A policy that does not give enough incentives 
to cash the fruits of previous savings will be inefficient.  Consequently, our results strongly 
suggest that the design and implementation of time inconsistent instruments demand great 
vigilance as early deviations from predictions alter the incentives introduced by each policy, 
encouraging thereby non optimal behaviour or just confusing agents with distorted signals. 
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Appendix: Equilibrium Derivation 
 
In this appendix we show how the Rational, the Myopic and the Optimum outcomes are 
derived. 
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Rational outcome 
 
The optimisation horizon is finite and known with certainty. Each appropriator calculates a 
feedback  strategy,  supposing  that  there  are  N-1  other  appropriators  behave  in  the  same 
manner (Equation A2.4). Each solves the program: 
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Myopic outcome 
 
In the myopic behaviour case, the optimization horizon is just one period. Supposing that 
everybody  behaves  myopically,  the  myopic  appropriator  calculates  a  period’s  profit 
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Each period withdrawals are represented by a function of the available stock that is invariant 
with time,  ( )
t
i S y   i " , resulting from the solution of the equation system constituted of the 
program (B)’s N F.O.C.: 
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Note that the myopic optimal feedback is similar to the period T rational optimal feedback. 





In each period t, withdrawers behaves like a benevolent regulator, they maximise the sum of 
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Like in the rational outcome, each period extractions are,
t
i y
* , are a function of the available 
stock and time (equations A.1). It is just needed to replace equations A.1.4 by A.3.7, A.1.6 by 
A.3.9, and A.1.3 par :  
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